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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT

ARYEH NEIER*
As a distinguished scholar-practitioner, Harold Hongju Koh came to his
post as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights with the best possible
preparation. His performance fulfilled the high expectations of proponents for
human rights. Though I count myself among his many admirers, I devote this
Essay to a couple of points on which I take issue with the views he expresses.
The first has to do with the question of early warning. I touch on this only
briefly because it is the subject of a new book by Samantha Power, A Problem
From Hell.1 It is not possible here to do justice to the issues Ms. Power
discusses in her excellent book on the American response to genocide. Suffice
it to say that the evidence Ms. Power collects about several recent genocides—
the Cambodian holocaust of the mid-1970’s, the Iraqi “Anfal” in which Kurds
were slaughtered in 1987-88 at the end of the Iraq-Iran war, the Bosnian
disaster of 1992-95 and the Rwandan genocide of 1994—is at odds with
Harold Hongju Koh’s view that the issue is “getting the right information into
the right hands at the right moment, before large-scale abuses actually take
place, in time to generate the political will necessary to head off the explosion
of atrocities.”2 Unfortunately, it appears the problem in responding to
genocide is not an absence of information or the question of who has the
information on a timely basis. Nor is political will to respond generated
spontaneously by getting these things to come together. The Bosnian case is
the most glaring example. Far from a shortage of information, Americans and
everyone else were saturated with news coverage of what was taking place.
Thanks to satellite communications, the siege of Sarajevo led the nightly news
almost every evening for an extended period. After a few weeks in which their
existence was concealed, journalists such as Roy Gutman and Ed Vulliamy
ensured that we knew all about death camps such as Omarska and Keratem.
Mass rape was widely reported. Yet it took more than three years, close to
200,000 deaths and the forcible expulsion of about two million people from
their homes and communities until the United States and its NATO allies
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1. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL (2002).
2. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 323 (2002).
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acted. Leadership was the missing element. Had there been leadership,
enough information was known in good time about Cambodia, about the Kurds
in Iraq and about Rwanda so that action could have been taken. Without it,
nothing was done.
Mr. Koh writes that “if there is reason to believe that atrocities are about to
happen, the United States should engage in preventive diplomacy—by which I
mean diplomacy backed by force . . . .”3 I agree. But as I am sure Mr. Koh
would concur, such diplomacy can only be effective if the threat of force is
credible. At the time the Rwandan genocide took place in 1994, the war in
Bosnia and the news of carnage there had been underway for two years. I am
skeptical that diplomatic efforts by the United States or the European powers
could have succeeded in preventing the Rwandan genocide at that point. Their
unreadiness to intervene forcefully to halt a genocide in the center of Europe
made it unlikely they would do what was required to prevent a genocide in the
center of Africa. This was well understood by the Rwandan government
officials who planned and organized the genocide. As it was, the United States
led the effort in the United Nations Security Council to evacuate United
Nations (U.N.) troops stationed in Rwanda. This was not a sign that our
government lacked information; rather, it suggested awareness that the
situation was deteriorating rapidly and reflected a desire to avoid an
engagement that might lead to deeper involvement. The Rwandan genocide
began just six months after eighteen American soldiers were killed in
Mogadishu.4 Eagerness to avoid a repetition of such an event seems to have
been the main concern of the United States. To back up preventive diplomacy
with a credible threat of force would have required leadership by a President
who gave higher priority to stopping genocide.
The second point on which I take issue involves China. Mr. Koh writes
that: “In the end, we delude ourselves if we believe that a country as large and
powerful as China will change its conduct simply because one other country
happens to impose unilateral economic sanctions upon them.”5 I acknowledge
that there is only scant evidence to contradict Mr. Koh on this point. One
reason for this lack of evidence is that not much by way of economic sanctions
has ever been imposed on China. Hence, the question of whether such
sanctions would work is largely a matter of speculation. The same may be
said, however, for Mr. Koh’s contrary proposition. He states that: “The only
3. Id. at 324.
4. See Samantha Powers, Bystanders to Genocide, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE (Sept. 2001), at
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/09/power.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002); Lieutenant
Commander Glenn T. Ware, The Emerging Norm of the Humanitarian Intervention and
Presidential Decision Directive 25, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1997); Major James W. Herring,
Jr., We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families, 162 MIL. L.
REV. 236, 238-39 (1999) (book review).
5. Koh, supra note 2, at 322.
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way to bring about a long-term change in Chinese behavior is to organize an
ongoing, sustained, multilateral and bipartisan engagement with China that
repeatedly emphasizes the communal values of the global system . . . .”6 I am
uncertain whether Mr. Koh would agree that the engagement that has been
underway with China meets this standard. What can be said, however, is that it
has been sustained, multilateral and bipartisan—though perhaps lacking in an
emphasis on values—but there is no evidence that it has produced any change
in Chinese conduct. Certainly, it has not modified Chinese treatment of
dissent. As Beijing’s response to the Falun Gong movement indicates, its
conduct has not been modified in the slightest by engagement.7
It should be noted that the Chinese government has manifested its own
belief in the efficacy of economic sanctions by imposing them on governments
and corporations that criticize its human rights practices. Over the years, it has
played the United States against Europe, taking its business away from Airbus
when Europe was too outspoken about human rights and from Boeing when it
was our government that caused annoyance. In 1996, China threatened to take
its business away from the General Electric Company unless a subsidiary,
NBC, issued an apology for the comments of a broadcaster covering the
Olympics who pointed out—without providing any details—that the country
had human rights problems.8 The apology was given. A few months earlier,
Beijing cancelled a visit by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and
threatened to take its business elsewhere because the Bundestag adopted a
resolution critical of China’s policies in Tibet.
President George H.W. Bush imposed sanctions on China in 1989
following the June 3-4 crackdown on protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.9
Those sanctions—which did not include denial of most favored nation status
(MFN)—were violated by the Administration that imposed them almost before
the ink on the declaration announcing them was dry. A debate on MFN began
as the anniversary of the crackdown approached. By coincidence, the date for
the annual presidential waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974
Trade Act happened to be June 3. That timing was a key factor in setting off
the debates about MFN.
Each year for a few years, as June 3 approached, China released a few well
known political prisoners and announced some other measures intended to
show that its human rights practices were improving, such as ending martial
6. Id.
7. For information on the Falun Gong, see Koh, supra note 2, at 318 n.69; Erin Chlopak,
China’s Crackdown on Falun Gong, 9 No. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 17 (2001).
8. See NBC Apologizes for Costas’ China remarks at Olympics, AUSTIN AMERICANSTATESMAN, August 23, 1996, at C2, available at 1996 WL 3441828; Apology Issued For Bob
Costas, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, August 23, 1996, at C6, available at 1996 WL 5782775.
9. See Deb Riechmann, U.S. Courted As Crackdown Grew, THE COLUMBIAN, June 4, 2001,
at A4.
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law in Lhasa, Tibet and its commencement of negotiations with the
International Committee of the Red Cross to allow the Swiss organization to
visit its prisons. Then, as Mr. Koh points out, President Clinton announced in
1994 that he was delinking trade and human rights.10 Thereafter, he would
issue the annual waiver required under Jackson-Vanik without regard to the
human rights situation. China responded by rearresting its most prominent
political prisoner, Wei Jingsheng,—who had been released the previous year
when China was trying to persuade the International Olympics Committee to
designate Beijing as the site for the 2000 Olympics. Also, China ended its
discussions with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) about
access to its prisons. This is what I have in mind when I refer to “scant
evidence” that sanctions, or at least the prospect of sanctions, promote change.
Admittedly, it is not much to go on. But it is all we have.
There is, of course, substantial evidence that countries much smaller than
China can be changed by economic sanctions for human rights abuses. The
best examples are South Africa, where the U.S. Congress imposed sanctions in
October 1986 over President Ronald Reagan’s veto;11 and Poland, where the
Reagan Administration unilaterally imposed sanctions following the
declaration of martial law by the regime of General Wojciech Jaruzelski on
December 13, 1981. The latter is a particularly instructive example because
the Reagan Administration carefully calibrated the sanctions, modifying them
as Warsaw made improvements and finally ending them in February 1987
when the last political prisoners were released.12 And, more recently, there is
the example of Yugoslavia. It is hard to say exactly what part was played by
economic sanctions in the electoral defeat of Slobodan Milosevic in September
2000 and his overthrow a couple of weeks later when he refused to concede
defeat. All that can be said was that the desire by Serbs to be free of the
sanctions was one of a number of contributing factors.
The approach I favor for China—now, I regret to say, politically
irrelevant—was embodied in legislation that Congress considered and adopted
in 1992. Inspired by the Reagan Administration’s way of dealing with Poland
after martial law, it would have imposed tariffs selectively on China. These
would have been adjusted according to the way the human rights situation
developed. Congress adopted this approach, but we have no way of knowing
whether it would have worked because President George H.W. Bush vetoed it
on September 28, 1992. The House of Representatives voted to override, but
10. See Koh, supra note 2, at 317.
11. “The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act [of 1986], passed over President Ronald
Reagan’s veto, banned new investments and bank loans to South Africa and prohibited bilateral
trade in a number of goods.” Chronology of Foreign Policy-Related U.S. Trade Actions, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0997/ijee/ejchron.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
12. See Aryeh Neier, Economic Sanctions and Human Rights, in REALIZING HUMAN
RIGHTS 291 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison eds., 2000).
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the Senate vote of 59 to 40 fell short of the two-thirds majority required to
enact the measure. Then-candidate William Jefferson Clinton denounced the
President, his opponent in the elections that November, for “coddling tyrants”
from Belgrade to Beijing. Upon election to office, however, President Clinton
declined to intervene significantly in what Belgrade was doing to Bosnia until
another three years had elapsed, and, in the interim, ended all efforts to
influence Beijing’s behavior by threats of economic sanctions.
Though Clinton’s policies towards Belgrade and Beijing, as well as his
policy toward Kigali, leave me unenthusiastic about his overall human rights
record, I readily acknowledge that it had its attractive features. At the top of
the list, I place his policy towards Kosovo which represented a determination
to ensure that Milosevic would not be permitted to do again what he had done
to Bosnia; and the designation first of John Shattuck and then of Harold
Hongju Koh to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights. My
long-term colleague from our days when we both served on the staff of the
American Civil Liberties Union in the 1970’s, Mr. Shattuck served, not always
comfortably, during the period in which the policies involving trade with
China unhampered by human rights considerations, non-intervention in
Rwanda and greatly delayed intervention in Bosnia were formed and
implemented. Mr. Koh’s service covered the latter Clinton years when what I
consider the more affirmative action toward Kosovo was the highlight of the
Administration’s policy on human rights.
As I feel certain Mr. Koh would agree, questions of the magnitude of
relations with China or military intervention cannot be resolved by an Assistant
Secretary of State. They take place in the context of a political process and
must be decided by the country’s political leader, the President of the United
States. An Assistant Secretary of State can contribute to the process by
ensuring that the right information is available at the right time, but only the
President can supply the leadership that Mr. Koh refers to as “political will.”13
It does not detract from what Harold Hongju Koh achieved, nor from what his
predecessor, John Shattuck, did when he held the office of Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Rights, to point out that the President they served was
flawed.

13. Koh, supra note 2, at 323.
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